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Let me begin with two overriding impressions that I take away from
this conference. The ﬁrst is that, when it comes to the issues we have been
discussing, a very large dose of humility on the part of both policymakers
and practitioners is fully justiﬁed. My second impression I will share with
you by means of an anecdote. Some of you know that Fed Chairman Paul
Volcker and I have been friends for what is now the better part of 20
years. Every now and then we sneak off and do a little ﬂy ﬁshing for trout.
On one occasion Paul and I had just ﬁnished a ﬂoat down the Madison
River out in Montana. As we were pulling the boat out, the guide looked
at the two of us and asked, “Who caught the biggest ﬁsh?” I immediately
responded, “I did!” Volcker looked at the guide and said, “What are you
talking about? The issue is not who caught the biggest ﬁsh. The issue is
who caught the most ﬁsh.” The message here, of course, is that in
international ﬁnance, as well as in trout ﬁshing, even the right question is
very much in the eyes of the beholder. Now, having said that, let me tick
off a few reminders that we need to keep in mind.
First, despite all the discussion about capital controls, and capital
ﬂows, let us remember that in virtually every signiﬁcant emerging market
crisis that I know of, domestic capital is usually the ﬁrst thing out.
Second, the point has already been made that we have to distinguish
between countries: emerging, industrial, and so on. But I think it also
needs to be emphasized, particularly when we talk about emerging
market countries, that all of them are small, and most of them are very
small, as well as very open. If you look at measures such as the ratio of
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are much higher than they are in virtually all industrial countries.
Third point: references have been made to various triangles. I want
to mention another triangle, the triangle of current account deﬁcits, ﬁxed
exchange rates, and weak banking systems. If a country is lucky, it can get
away with one. If very lucky, it might get away with two, but it will never
get away with all three.
The next point is that when the current account is part of the
problem, the adjustment process must involve a substantial shrinkage in
the domestic savings gap. That shrinkage in the domestic savings gap, at
least as best I can ﬁgure it out, can only come about in a context of
shrinkage in the domestic economy itself. So, there is no free lunch here,
no easy, painless way out.
My next reminder is that in just about every case I can think of, it is
undeniable that part of the core of the problem has been short-term debt,
especially bank debt in foreign currencies that is on-lent to domestic
entities, unhedged, or in the context of insufﬁcient foreign currency
revenues. It is also undeniable that weak banks are a big part of the
problem in most countries, but I believe it is wrong to say that this is
simply a matter of weak supervision. Again, the point has been made that
if it was that simple, then how do we explain some of the things that
happened in the United States in the 1980s?—and not just in the S&Ls, by
the way.
As I look at the situation in the emerging market countries where we
have had troubles, it does seem to me that, on the whole, the bulk of the
problem has been homegrown. That is not to say that Henry Kaufman, in
particular, is not correct when he suggests that some of the problem has
been aided and abetted by conditions in international markets and in
industrial countries. But I think that by and large the problems have been
homegrown.
The next point I want to make, and I will do this in very broad terms,
is that “bailing-in” the private sector is not going to be easy. Whether you
are talking about collective action clauses in bond contracts, restructur-
ings, or changed bankruptcy laws, any and all of these things are a little
bit like climbing Mount Everest with sneakers on. They are not easy to
execute, even though they are good ideas. We have to be realistic and
understand that under the best of circumstances, achieving more bal-
anced public and private sector responses to sovereign ﬁnancial crises
will take time, which brings me to my last reminder.
That is that, whether we like it or not, periodic bouts of signiﬁcant
ﬁnancial instability in the international arena will be with us as far out as
I can see, even though none of us are clairvoyant enough to anticipate
precisely where the next shock will come from. But, in these circum-
stances, our thinking about the future has to involve some sense of
urgency, because that next shock will be there, somewhere.
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Ralph Bryant’s pragmatic incrementalism. As a matter of fact, I wish I had
thought of the phrase. I ﬁnd myself in sympathy with more than the
phrase, with the substance of what Bryant was talking about. Thus, in the
context of what I have just summarized, I would say ﬁrst, ladies and
gentlemen, that architecture is not the issue. The issue is engineering and
plumbing. If we spend the next three, four, or ﬁve years worrying about
architecture, events will supersede policy. The issue is this: How do we
make existing institutions work better? How do we build on some of the
things that we already have and discard some of the things that have not
worked particularly well? If we were to set out today with universal
agreement on some new architecture, it would probably take ﬁve or ten
years to get the political support and the infrastructure to get it in place.
Forget about architecture, let us focus on the engineering and the
plumbing, that is where the issues lie.
My second point is fairly obvious but let me make it anyway. I do
think that capital controls really are a very slippery slope. I say that with
some humility, because I have in the past talked with some favor about
the Chilean model. Sebastian Edwards’s paper for me was a bucket of
cold water, in terms of reminding me that what you see is not always
what you get, in this arena. Several comments were made yesterday
about Malaysia and there, too, what you see is not what you get because,
among other problems, the private sector found very effective ways
around the Malaysian style of capital controls. One can at least conjecture
that the presence of the capital controls delayed the necessity for the
authorities in Malaysia to come to grips with their own domestic banking
sector problems. Being a pragmatist, I guess I also belong to the camp of
“Never say never,” but I have to say that this new enthusiasm for capital
controls worries me.
Now, let me justify never saying never with my own exception. The
question of the unsecured, short-term, foreign currency borrowing by
banks in emerging market countries, clearly, is critically important. I do
agree with Jeffrey Sachs and others who have said that we can get at that
problem through prudential supervisory policies on both ends; that is,
perhaps, up-front provisions for the banks that make those loans, and
up-front provisions for the banks that receive those loans. I would put
that under the umbrella of banking supervision and prudential policy,
not capital controls, and not just for semantic reasons but for substantive
reasons, even though the semantics may escape you.
My third point is that we need structural reforms and institution-
building side by side with improved macroeconomic policies, and they
take time. Fundamentals are an issue of great importance in most
emerging market countries, but there is no doubt about the even more
pressing importance of the banking sector issue. But you are not going to
ﬁx that issue with enhanced supervision alone, and even if you could, in
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supervisory systems and the people to make those systems work. Again,
we must be realistic.
One other quick point: All of this has to take place in the context of
a phenomenon that no one has mentioned here, asset price inﬂation. We
see case after case of asset price inﬂation in both industrial and emerging
market countries, in a setting in which there is reasonable overall
inﬂationary performance. No one has to my knowledge yet come up with
a way to square the circle, with those two phenomena operating side by
side in both industrial and emerging market countries.
Finally, on the exchange rate question, two quick observations. First,
no matter which exchange rate regime you pick, if you do not have the
right policy fundamentals, it is not going to work. And the converse is
also true. If you really have the right fundamentals and you sustain them,
it probably does not matter which exchange rate regime you pick. But I
have come to the view that for most emerging market countries, the
prudent course is ﬂexible exchange rates, working toward a more
managed exchange rate regime over time. The question of the right
regime for industrial countries Mr. Volcker will speak to with great
eloquence, so allow me now to turn matters over to Paul.
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